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Abstract  
 
This paper empirically investigates the role of governance institutions in shaping the economic impact 
of services trade reform. The analysis focuses on the effects of services trade policy on the 
productivity of manufacturing sectors that use services as intermediate inputs. We find that these 
effects depend on the quality of governance institutions in the country implementing trade and 
investment reform. The moderating effects of horizontal (cross-cutting) and services sector-specific 
dimensions of economic governance institutions are found to differ. For some services activities 
market access opening can substitute for weak regulation/governance; in others bad regulatory 
governance is a binding constraint and needs to be addressed directly for market opening to have the 
greatest benefits. Our empirical findings suggest these complementarity and substitution relationships 
may be associated with the types of market failure that arise in different services sectors and the 
effectiveness of regulatory regimes in addressing them. We also find that positive effects of services 
trade and investment reforms are higher in EU member states. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent research has demonstrated that the cost, quality and variety of services available to firms across 
all sectors is an important determinant of their productivity, and that services trade is a channel 
through which firms’ access to services can be improved. The effects of policies restricting access of 
foreign producers to services markets on downstream productivity performance have been estimated in 
country case studies using firm level data (e.g., Arnold et al. 2011 for Czech Republic; Arnold et al. 
2016 for the case of India) and across countries using both firm- and industry-level data (e.g., 
Hoekman and Shepherd, 2017 and Beverelli et al., 2017). This paper builds on the findings of 
Beverelli et al. (2017) which shows that the downstream effect of services trade policies are moderated 
by the quality of economic governance institutions in the importing country as measured by indicators 
of the control of corruption and rule of law. Lower services trade restrictiveness is found to increase 
downstream manufacturing productivity only in countries with good economic governance. This 
moderating effect prevails with respect to policies that target services provision through foreign 
establishment (FDI) (mode 3 of the GATS) as opposed to cross-border trade in services (mode 1), a 
result that may reflect the lower incidence of barriers to mode 1 trade as well as the intangibility and 
nonstorability of services, which imply that at least some share of the value added must be generated 
locally.  
While it is important to know that domestic economic governance institutions affect the impact of 
services trade policy, this leaves open the question whether the effect of services trade policies is 
simply conditional on horizontal, country-wide governance quality – the types of variables reported in 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators and Doing Business databases – or whether such 
broad measures of economic governance are in fact capturing sector-specific regulation and related 
institutions as well as general investment climate factors. This is both a salient research and policy 
question: if there is a significant sectoral dimension to the result that governance matters for the 
impact of services trade liberalisation, policy efforts should go further than seeking to bolster the rule 
of law or control corruption. The fact that the performance of economies over time is very 
heterogeneous, with some countries with weak (strong) governance experiencing relatively strong 
(weak) economic growth suggests economy-wide governance performance is not the whole story. 
Governance variables can be ‘unpacked’ across horizontal and sectoral dimensions. Horizontal 
components of economic governance include barriers to entrepreneurship – such as complex and 
cumbersome administrative burdens on start-ups – and the extent of state-ownership and control of the 
economy.  Sectoral dimensions comprise the specific regulatory regimes that apply to services 
industries (e.g., to ensure access to network infrastructure, bottleneck facilities or interconnection; 
existence of an independent regulatory body; dedicated mechanisms to contest regulatory decisions; 
whether the industry is permitted to regulate itself and define/control the conditions of entry). 
Effective regulatory and governance institutions may be necessary for positive downstream 
performance effects of low services trade restrictions and thus complement a liberal trade regime. 
Conversely, services trade openness may substitute for good domestic (horizontal and/or sectoral) 
governance and therefore be more effective in countries where the latter is weak. Understanding the 
complementarity and/or substitutability between services trade openness and different types of 
governance institutions may have important implications for the timing and design of services trade 
reforms and trade agreements and flanking measures targeting regulatory reforms. 
In this paper we assess empirically the role of horizontal and sector-specific governance institutions in 
shaping the downstream effects of trade policies for producer services. The empirical results 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship (complementarity versus substitutability) between 
trade openness and governance institutions affecting producer services markets. There is significant 
heterogeneity among EU member states (MS) in the quality of domestic economic governance. This 
affects the impact of services trade reforms enacted at the EU level and can result in significant 
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asymmetry in the magnitude of the potential net benefits of services liberalisation. Such distributional 
effects may have implications for political support for trade agreements across the EU and may help 
explain some of the recent opposition in the EU to trade integration initiatives with third countries 
such as Canada and the United States.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship between upstream 
services trade policy and downstream industry performance and the different roles regulatory 
governance institutions may have in moderating the effects of services trade policy. We also present 
descriptive evidence on relevant dimensions of economic governance in the EU. Section 3 presents the 
econometric framework and the data. Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. SERVICES TRADE REFORMS, SUPPLY CHAINS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
Services such as finance, insurance, ICT services, transport and logistics are inputs into many 
production processes. Because of their relevance as inputs for downstream producers they are often 
referred to as producer or business services. Such services differ from manufactured intermediate 
inputs (parts and components). A key economic feature of producer services inputs is the role they 
play in coordinating and controlling complex production activities that are distributed over time and 
space. For instance, ICT, transport and logistics services connect workers and/or capital units across 
space; financial services allow firms to fund and manage the risk of routine as well as complex 
production operations over time. These services have become even more important as businesses 
engage in international production and participate in global value chains (GVCs) that require the 
coordination of activities of different firms located in different geographical regions. As “facilitators” 
of unbundled and fragmented production processes, producer services inputs directly affect the 
feasibility of the associated specialisation and the scale of downstream economic activity (Francois, 
1990; Francois and Hoekman, 2010). 
Using linked input-output tables for OECD countries, Miroudot et al. (2009) find that 73% of all 
services trade between 1995 and 2005 was accounted for by trade in services inputs. This is a much 
bigger figure than in the case of trade in goods, where manufactured intermediate inputs accounted for 
56% of total trade flows in the same period. These patterns suggest that international trade in services 
is an important channel for firms to gain access to the cheapest and most efficient services inputs and 
that restrictive trade and investment policies that reduce the degree of competition on services markets 
will have adverse consequences for the performance (competitiveness) of downstream manufacturing 
sectors. 
This argument is consistent with the recent literature on input tariff liberalisation, which focuses on the 
downstream effects of tariffs that apply to manufactured goods used as intermediate inputs in 
production. Amiti and Konings (2007) show that reducing input tariffs by 10% increases productivity 
of Indonesian firms importing these inputs by 12%. Lower input tariffs can have a positive causal 
effect on downstream firms’ productivity by giving them access to more varieties or higher quality 
inputs and by allowing firms to learn from the foreign technology embedded in imported inputs. 
Analogous evidence comes from research on Indian firms. Goldberg et al. (2010) find that lowering 
input tariffs in India accounted for 31% of the new products introduced by Indian firms in the 1987-97 
period. De Loecker et al. (2016) show that input tariff liberalisation reduced marginal costs of 
downstream Indian producers. Similar empirical research on services trade restrictions identify sizable 
positive effects of services trade liberalisation for the productivity and export performance of firms 
operating in downstream industries (notably manufacturing) – see, e.g., Arnold et al. (2011) for the 
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case of Czech Republic; Duggan et al. (2013) for Indonesia; and Bas (2014) and Arnold et al. (2016) 
for India. 
Market access policies for producer services impact on the productivity of downstream firms or 
sectors by affecting services sectors’ performance. The performance of services sectors is also 
influenced by regulatory policies that affect the degree of competition in the relevant markets. The 
impact of domestic regulatory frameworks on downstream productivity has been investigated in many 
studies, including Fernandes and Paunov (2011) for Chile, Forlani (2012) for France, and Hoekman 
and Shepherd (2015) for a large set of developing economies. Empirical exercises for OECD countries 
using sector-level data include Barone and Cingano (2011) and Bourlès et al. (2013). The general 
finding of this literature is that domestic regulation of services markets can have sizable impacts on 
downstream productivity and/or export performance. 
2.2. THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 
It is well established in the economic literature that, in the long run, the quality of institutions will 
affect the level of comparative development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). It has also 
long been known that economic governance and related institutions represent an important source of 
comparative advantage in certain industries, notably the ones where economic governance is more 
important such as those that are more contract-intensive (see Nunn and Trefler, 2014 for a review). 
Finally, there exist some consensus and evidence in the literature that the benefits from trade 
liberalisation depend on country-specific conditioning factors, such as the quality of local governance 
institutions (see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001 and Freund and Bolaky, 2008). 
Governance institutions can also be expected to moderate the downstream effect of services trade 
reforms. Beverelli et al. (2017) find that in the short and medium run, governance variables such as the 
strength of the rule of law, control of corruption and the quality of domestic regulation can shape the 
downstream effects of services trade policies. They conclude that removing barriers to cross-border 
services trade may be largely ineffective in cases where pervasive corruption and weak rule of law 
generates excessive economic uncertainty and insecurity. This is consistent with Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) and Ranjan and Lee (2007) who find that low low-quality-institutions reduce 
inward trade flows. An implication is that eliminating restrictions on inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) may fail to induce any positive downstream effect if weak governance institutions in the host 
country discourage foreign firms to enter the market (in the expectation of too many institutions-drive 
frictions to their economic activity), or, if they enter, forces them to operate inefficiently (see for 
instance Dort, Méon, and Sekkat, 2014 and Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae, 2005). 
The literature analysing the interaction between governance indicators such as control of corruption, 
regulatory quality and rule of law as defined in the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) Database 
suggests there a complementarity relationship between the quality of domestic governance and the 
benefits of market access liberalisation, i.e., better governance enhances the positive downstream 
effects of liberalisation. These measures of governance are proxies for the quality of the investment 
climate in a country. They are horizontal in nature, affecting activities in all sectors. They are likely to 
capture to a greater or lesser extent the effects of more specific dimensions of economic governance 
that determine the conditions of entry into a market. Examples include the scope of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, government involvement in price setting (price controls), licensing 
and permit systems, and services sector specific regulation. Determining the extent to which the latter 
types of economic governance and regulatory policies impact on the benefits of services trade 
liberalisation is important from a policy perspective as it may be both easier to change sector or 
activity-specific regulation than it is to improve the rule of law or to combat corruption and, as 
important, more feasible to do so in the short run.  
Broad governance variables and associated institutions that determine the extent to which the rule of 
law prevails are entrenched in the economic system and effectively are exogenous to short and even 
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medium term economic policy reforms such as market access opening. Improving rule of law and 
controlling corruption requires time as it calls for general systemic reforms in public administration, 
the civil service and political institutions. This is less the case for sector-level regulation or regulatory 
measures that affect entry or conduct of firms. Insofar as the complementarity relationship found in 
Beverelli et al. (2017) between broad governance variables and services trade reforms holds for 
narrower types of economic governance this would imply policy reforms should center on the latter so 
as to complement services trade liberalisation initiatives. Alternatively, it may be the case that market 
opening can substitute for sectoral governance reforms. If so, policy should prioritise services trade 
liberalisation. To illustrate, consider the case of barriers to entrepreneurship captured by the degree of 
complexity and clarity of the regulatory regime. Low quality economic governance reflected in 
complex and ambiguous regulations that are difficult to account for in business plans may generate 
uncertainty, a need to plan for unpredictable shocks to production processes and deter investment by 
firms. Large foreign services providers, equipped with a superior technology and greater resources 
than domestic providers, may be better able to deal with such a regulatory environment than many 
domestic incumbents. If so, there would be a substitutability relationship between domestic 
governance and market access reforms: opening the market to foreign providers can substitute for 
good domestic governance in terms of increasing the quality and decreasing the price of services 
inputs for domestic manufacturing firms. 
The extent to which good domestic economic governance is a necessary condition for a strong positive 
downstream effect of market access reforms for producer services (that is, for there to be 
complementarity relationship), as opposed to market access acting as a substitute for good economic 
governance – and therefore having relatively greater positive effects in situations characterised by low 
quality governance institutions – is an empirical question. The relationships will be determined in part 
by how restrictive horizontal (cross-cutting) regulatory measures are in constraining new entry and 
being able to operate profitably, and in part by the type of market failure that is likely to prevail in a 
given service sector and call for regulation.1 
Focusing on the first dimension, the impact on regulation on entry and/or operating costs will vary. 
Some types of regulation – e.g., a simple registration requirement – will only impose a small burden 
on operators. Other types of regulation may be very difficult for new entrants to overcome and can 
even prohibit entry – e.g., a ban on investment in complementary infrastructure facilities such as a 
warehouse/logistics center; highly restrictive economic needs tests; or regulation reserving certain 
types of transactions to a SOE. The benefits of removal of services trade barriers (discriminatory 
measures) will be affected by the applicable measures regulating entry. As long as they are not 
prohibitive, the most (more) efficient foreign providers can be expected to be able to satisfy the 
regulatory requirements. These may raise costs above what they would be if, for example, regulatory 
cooperation allowed mutual recognition or equivalence, but some level of trade can be expected to 
occur. In this case market access can be a substitute for regulatory reform. If, however, regulation is 
such as to essentially preclude entry – e.g., because of state control of prices or the existence of SOEs 
that dominate (segments of) the market – services trade liberalisation may not have much of an effect 
on incentives to enter the market. In this case there is more likely to be a complementary relationship 
between services trade policy and sector-level regulation: reforms will need to target both policy areas. 
Moving to sector specific economic governance, similar dynamics may arise as with cross-sectoral 
regulatory regimes but there is likely to be an additional dimension: the extent to which different types 
of market failures motivate (or should motivate) regulation. For some services sectors where there are 
significant network externalities there is a rationale for both public investment in infrastructure and 
regulation of the relevant network to ensure interconnection and access. In other sectors the primary 
source of market failure is information asymmetries. In case of transport and telecommunications, 
network infrastructures are central. Weak regulatory regimes that permit exploitation of market power 
by incumbent operators can prohibit entry by new operators. This feature of regulation cannot be 
offset by services trade liberalisation. In practice it will often be prohibitively expensive for new 
                                                            
1 See Copeland and Mattoo (2008) for a discussion of different rationales for regulation of services activities. 
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entrants to develop their own network infrastructure – they will not be able to overcome a 
government’s failure to put in place and enforce pro-competitive regulation. Absent effective pro-
competitive regulation, market access liberalisation can be expected to have smaller positive 
downstream productivity effects. There is strong complementarity between good regulation and the 
potential benefits of services trade liberalisation. 
Such complementarity is less likely to apply for producer services where network externalities are less 
prevalent or do not figure at all. In the case of business services, for example, the main rationale for 
regulation is to deal with problems of asymmetric information. In cases where domestic regulation is 
ineffective in addressing this problem it is relatively easier for foreign providers to address such 
regulatory failure and take action to offset at least to some extent the underlying market imperfection – 
e.g., establishing a reputation for quality by leveraging foreign regulatory certification and/or 
international certification (such as compliance with ISO standards). In this example the result is likely 
to be a substitution relationship between domestic sectoral regulation/governance and market access 
reform. 
In addition to the horizontal and sector-specific dimensions of economic regulation, another feature of 
the governance—market access relationship that is relevant in the EU context is the role of common 
EU institutions. EU membership (and accession) is associated with a set of obligations to apply EU 
law and regulation and to pursue shared values. In the case of services the Single Market Strategy and 
associated EU directives, combined with monitoring of implementation by the European Commission, 
the possibility of infringement procedures and challenging specific policies before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, and, ultimately, penalties for non-compliance are likely to affect the extent to 
which governance affects market access liberalisation across EU member states. Understanding 
whether these EU-specific dimensions of governance have a complementary or substitution 
relationship with market access reforms has important policy implications. In the case of 
complementarity, EU accession and/or full implementation of EU Directives could be a tool to 
maximise the gains from opening services markets and therefore be prioritised as a policy objective 
before or in parallel with further market access reform in services markets – e.g., in the context of free 
trade agreements such as TTIP. In the substitutability case, countries outside the EU as well as EU 
member states with the lowest level of compliance with the EU Service Directive would be the ones 
with the highest potential for short-run downstream gains from services liberalisations, with associated 
implications for the distributional effects of trade reforms. 
2.3. SERVICES TRADE POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN EU MEMBER STATES 
The EU does not (yet) have a common external services trade and investment policy. Nor do the EU 
member states have the same quality of economic governance or service-sector specific regulatory 
regimes.2 Graph 2.1 plots an indicator of applied discriminatory barriers to FDI in services – what is 
called mode 3 services trade barriers in WTO speak – for four producer services sectors and 24 
member states in 2010. This is a good proxy for countries’ services trade restrictiveness as FDI is the 
most important mode through which foreign providers can contest markets and supply services 
(Francois and Hoekman, 2010). The data reveal substantial heterogeneity across EU members and 
sectors. 
FDI restrictions for financial services appear to be minimal everywhere in the EU, whereas barriers in 
transport, telecommunications and business services are relatively significant for several member 
states. FDI restrictions in the transport sector tend to be the highest for many countries. Graphs 2.2 and 
2.3 report data on four horizontal or cross-cutting dimensions of economic governance across EU 
member states and time. The indicators reported are from the OECD Product Market Regulation 
(PMR) database and span barriers to entrepreneurship, the extent of state control of the economy, a 
composite measure of the complexity of regulatory regimes, and the governance of state-owned 
                                                            
2 The measures and the data sources introduced in this Section are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
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enterprises. The PMR indicators suggest substantial heterogeneity in these governance-related 
variables in the EU (Graph 2.2) and a positive trend toward better quality economic governance over 
time, especially for barriers to entrepreneurship (Graph 2.3). Graphs 2.4 and 2.5 suggest very similar 
conclusions can be drawn from data on sector-specific dimensions of economic governance for 
transportation services, telecommunications and business services. 
Graph 2.1. Applied discriminatory barriers to services trade (Mode 3) 
 
Note: 1 = maximum restrictions; 0 = no restrictions. Data refer to the applied policy stance in 2010. 
Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Database. 
Graph 2.2. Governance: horizontal dimensions across EU Member States 
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, Economy Wide Database 
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Graph 2.3. Governance: horizontal dimensions over time  
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, Economy Wide Database 
 
Graph 2.4. Governance: sector-specific dimensions across EU Member States 
 
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, ETCR and Professional Services Database. 
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Graph 2.5. Governance: sector-specific dimensions over time 
  
Note: 1 = highest barriers/minimum quality. Data refer to the quality of governance in 2013. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation, ETCR and Professional Services Database. 
More detailed measures of policy can be constructed for EU member states than for OECD countries 
based on the degree of compliance with EU Directives which contain requirements pertaining to the 
governance of services sectors. A key measure is the Services Directive which was adopted in 2006, 
with transposition to have been completed by 2009. This directive covers services sectors accounting 
for some 45 percent of EU GDP.  It imposes disciplines on the use of prior authorisations for provision 
of services, licensing for retail stores, specific authorisations for the sale of certain products at retail 
level and economic needs tests for retail outlets (Art. 9). It requires the removal of explicitly 
discriminatory policies such as nationality tests, requirements that a provider establish or join a 
professional body if this has already been done in an EU member state, that the firm’s headquarters be 
located in the country, conditioning operations on economic needs tests, requiring financial guarantees 
or insurance from a host country provider, and involvement of (domestic) competitors in the process 
of granting authorisation to operate (Art. 14). It also imposes disciplines on non-discriminatory 
regulatory requirements that may impede market access– e.g., limits on the number of establishments 
that are permitted or requirements that a firm employ a minimum number of employees (Art. 16).  
Art. 15 SD imposes disciplines on countries maintaining potentially competition-restricting regulatory 
measures justified on public interest grounds. Such measures– e.g., quantitative or territorial 
limitations, restrictions on the legal form of an entity, requirements concerning equity holdings, or 
price controls – must be transparent. To help assure this, governments are required to establish Points 
of Single Contact – “one-stop shops” where firms can obtain all necessary information on 
requirements that need to be satisfied to provide services in a country. Art. 15 also imposes specific 
substantive disciplines. Measures may not directly or indirectly discriminate according to nationality 
and/or, in the case of companies, on the basis of the location of the registered office; they must be 
justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (a necessity test) and not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain that public interest objective (a proportionality test). An important 
dimension of implementation of Art. 15 is a mutual evaluation process. Member states are tasked with 
assessing for themselves whether their regulatory requirements satisfy the substantive criteria of Art. 
15 (necessity, proportionality) and must share their reasoning with other member states. 
Graph 2.6 reports descriptive evidence on EU Member State compliance with the 2006 Services 
Directive in two sectors: hotels and legal services. Looking at the hotels sector, the graph shows 
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almost complete compliance (full transposition) across all member states. This contrasts with the 
situation for legal services, a key component of the producer services sector and an important input 
into manufacturing production. The data suggest that many countries are not fully complying with the 
requirements of the Services Directive. 
Graph 2.6. EU Services Directive transposition 
 
Note: Simple average of implementation of the Services Directive across requirements.  1 = complete 
implementation; 0 = no implementation. Data capture extent implementation in 2009. 
Source: Monteagudo et al. (2012) 
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
The object of the empirical analysis that follows is to assess the role of different dimensions of 
governance institutions in shaping the downstream effects of trade policies targeting producer 
services. The results will inform the above discussion of the mechanics governing the relationship 
(complementarity versus substitutability) between trade openness and governance institutions in the 
context of producer services markets. We follow the methodology developed in Beverelli et al. (2017) 
and use a measure of labour productivity varying at the country 𝑖 and manufacturing sector 𝑗 level 
(𝑦𝑖𝑖) as dependent variable. To capture the impact of services trade restrictiveness on downstream 
sectors we define a composite trade restrictiveness index defined as: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 × 𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a restrictiveness index for imports (foreign sales) of service 𝑠 in country 𝑖, and 𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 
measure of how much downstream sector 𝑗 in country 𝑖 uses service 𝑠 as an intermediate input to 
produce its output. The main focus of the analysis will be on the interaction between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 
detailed measures of country-level governance institutions capturing the specific dimension of 
governance 𝑑 (𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖), as follows: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) + 𝜇�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) × 𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖(𝑖−1)� + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
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where 𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1) is the capital-labor ratio, a relevant determinant of productivity that is potentially 
correlated with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑖−1); 𝛿𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖𝑖 are country-time and sector-time fixed effects, respectively; and 
𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. 
The estimated marginal effects of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 on 𝑦 are given by: 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝐶𝐶𝐶
� = ?̂? + ?̂? × 𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖 
and depend on country-level institutions captured by the variable 𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖. The sign of ?̂? will identify the 
nature of the moderating role of institutions (complement or substitute) in influencing the downstream 
productivity effects of producer services trade policy. For each dimension 𝑑, the respective version of 
equation (1) is estimated. 
In a baseline model without the interaction term 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 × 𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖, the marginal effect of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 on labour 
productivity is given by the estimated coefficient, ?̂?. Based on the empirical evidence in the literature 
discussed above we expect ?̂? to be negative and statistically significant. Reducing restrictions to trade 
in producer services (i.e., a decrease in the value of 𝐶𝐶, reflected in a proportional decrease in 𝐶𝐶𝐶) is 
expected to increase the labor productivity of downstream manufacturing sectors. A positive sign for 
the point estimate ?̂? in the interaction model (1) would then suggest that a lower value of the 
moderating governance variable 𝐺𝐶𝑑 is associated with a larger positive impact of reducing services 
trade restrictions on downstream manufacturing.  
We assess the moderating role of seven horizontal dimensions of governance and three sector specific 
ones using OECD data (see below). Horizontal dimensions consist of two aggregate composite 
categories, barriers to entrepreneurs (𝐺𝐶bars to entrp) and state control (𝐺𝐶state ctrl), and five sub-
categories. Three of these are elements of the composite measure of barriers to entrepreneurship – (i) 
administrative burdens (𝐺𝐶admin burdens); (ii) complexity of regulations (𝐺𝐶complexity of reg);  and (iii) 
regulatory protection of incumbent operators (𝐺𝐶protec of incumb). The other two sub-categories are 
elements of the composite indicator of state control: (iv) a measure of the extent of government 
intervention in business (𝐺𝐶gvt in business); and (v) the relative importance of state owned enterprises 
(𝐺𝐶public ownership). The three sector-specific regulatory governance measures pertain to transport 
(𝐺𝐶transport), post and telecommunications (𝐺𝐶telecom), and business services (𝐺𝐶business). 𝐺𝐶transport is 
the simple average of five indicators: scope of public ownership in air transports, scope of public 
ownership in rail transport, price regulation in road transport, market structure in the rail transport 
sector, and vertical integration in rail transport. 𝐺𝐶telecom is the simple average of four indicators: scope 
of public ownership in the postal sector, market structure of the postal sector, scope of public 
ownership in the telecommunications, and market structure of the telecommunication sector. 𝐺𝐶business 
is the simple average of four conduct regulation indicators for accountants, architects, engineers and 
legal service providers.  
All of these variables range between 0 and 1. The lower the value, the higher the quality of the 
associated governance institutions in a pro-competitive sense. Therefore, a positive sign for ?̂? is 
suggestive of a complementarity role of domestic governance with respect to market access 
liberalisation: reducing barriers to services trade has a stronger positive effect on downstream 
manufacturing sectors given higher quality of domestic economic governance. In contrast, a negative 
sign for the estimate of ?̂? suggests a substitutability role of domestic governance with respect to 
market access liberalisation: when domestic governance is weak, opening markets for producer 
services to international trade and investment has a strong positive effect on the productivity of 
downstream manufacturing sectors. 
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To test empirically the moderating function of governance dimensions that reflect the role of EU 
institutions we define the following four variables. A dummy 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 taking value 1 is the country 𝑖 is a 
member of the European Union at time 𝑡; a dummy 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 taking value 1 if the Services Directive in in 
force in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡; two continuous variables –  𝑆𝑆𝑆all;𝑖𝑖 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆business;𝑖𝑖  – that measure the 
level of compliance of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 with the requirements of the Services Directive. The first of 
these captures all service sectors covered by the directive and recorded in our data (including business 
services and several non-producer services such as hotels, restaurants, travel agencies). The second 
variable spans business services only. Both variables vary between 0 to 1 with 0 (1) representing 
minimum (maximum) compliance.  
We then re-estimate equation (1), replacing 𝐺𝐶𝑑;𝑖 with each of these four proxies of EU related 
governance institutions. The interpretation of the estimated sign for the coefficient 𝜇 is consistent with 
the definition of each EU-related governance variable. In general, a value of 1 for these moderators 
means that the associated dimension of governance is active/present, either in the form of EU 
membership, or applicability of/compliance with the requirements of the Services Directive. 
Therefore, a negative sign for the point estimate ?̂? reflects a relationship between market access 
liberalisation and EU-based domestic governance such that the positive downstream effects of the 
former are amplified where EU institutions are more deeply embedded in domestic governance (either 
through EU membership, or through applicability of/compliance with the Services Directive). 
Endogeneity resulting from observable and/or unobservable heterogeneity is not a serious concern for 
the chosen specification. Country-time and sector-time fixed effects control for any country- or sector-
specific time contingent shock that has the property of affecting both labour productivity and the 
regressors of interest. Endogeneity of input-output weights is addressed in a standard way as discussed 
below. 
Data on labour productivity are sourced from the STAN Database managed by the OECD. Concretely, 
we measure labour productivity as the natural logarithm of the ratio between value added and total 
employed persons. Capital and labour measures used to construct the capital-labour ratio come from 
the same database. Services trade policy is measured with the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index. This is available for multiple years, in contrast to the recent World Bank and OECD services 
trade restrictiveness indicators. Given the findings of empirical work in this area that FDI policies 
(affecting mode 3) are what matters (see Beverelli et al., 2017 for a discussion), the focus on mode 3 
(FDI) policies is not a major limitation. Horizontal governance variables come from the OECD 
Product Market Regulation – Economy Wide Database. Indicators reported in the PMR database that 
entail discrimination against foreign providers such as trade and FDI related policies are not used as 
market access policy is captured by the FDI restrictiveness indicator. Similarly, measures that entail 
discriminatory barriers to entry are systematically excluded from the construction of the sector specific 
regulatory variables. Proxies for the input-output weights 𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖 are given by the technical coefficients 
of IO matrices. To minimise the potential endogeneity of this component of the composite reform 
indicator we use US IO coefficients for the mid-1990s and apply these across all countries in our 
estimation sample.3 The IO data is drawn from the OECD STAN IO Database. The measures of 
transport- and telecommunication-specific governance are sourced from the OECD PMR – ETCR 
Database. The business-services specific governance variable is built from indicators in the OECD 
PMR Professional Services Database. 
The proxy for compliance with the requirements in the Services Directive is constructed from the 
database presented in Monteagudo et al. (2012). That database contains information on compliance 
with the main requirements of the Services Directive for fifteen services sectors. For each country-
sector pair, the database identifies a number of key policy areas embedded in 20 requirements across 
                                                            
3 For discussion and assessments of the appropriateness of using US weights as an indicator of the technological linkages 
between industries see Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Barone and Cingano (2011). 
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five key articles of the Services Directive.4  The database permits the construction of an indicator of 
the distance between the policy regime prevailing in country 𝑐, sector 𝑠, at time 𝑡 and the objective 
specified by the Services Directive embodied in requirement 𝑟. This measure of ‘convergence’, 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖, takes four discrete values between 0 or 1, with 0 (1) indicating minimum (maximum) 
convergence with the Services Directive requirements. Intermediate values of 0.2 and 0.8 are defined 
to account for partial compliance with the requirements.5 Starting from this convergence variable, 
𝑆𝑆𝑆all is computed as the simple average of CLcsrt across all requirements and sectors. Instead 
𝑆𝑆𝑆business is given by the simple average of 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 across all requirements but only for those business 
services covered in the data (accounting, architectural, engineering, legal, and tax advisory services). 
Some of the data series used in the analysis are not annual but span a selection of years. This is the 
case for the PMR Economy Wide Database, the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Database and the SD 
Database. In these cases we construct a panel by imputing the missing value at time 𝑡 with the non-
missing value at time 𝑡 − 1. Alternative imputation strategies as well as a conservative approach that 
uses only the reports data points do not substantially change the main results presented in the next 
section. 
Merging all variables together, we obtain an estimation sample consisting of 2888 observations which 
cover 12 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) plus Norway and New Zealand; up to 18 manufacturing 
sectors defined according to the ISIC Rev 3 (2 digit) categories; and 21 years, from 1989 to 2009. 
Table I.1 in Annex I reports summary statistics for all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
4. RESULTS 
Estimation results are organised per type of domestic governance variable. Column (1) in Table 4.1 
reports the benchmark estimates from a regression without the interaction term. The other columns 
present point estimates and standard errors for the coefficients in equation (1) when proxies of 
horizontal governance are interacted with the composite reform indicator. 
The estimated coefficient for 𝐶𝐶𝐶 in column (1) is negative and statistically significant. This replicates 
the finding in the literature of a positive downstream effect of removing market access barriers for 
services. The point estimate of -0.9 implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the composite 
reform indicator (-0.048) increases downstream labor productivity on average by 4.3%.6 Turning to 
the interaction models in columns (2)-(8), a number of findings emerge. First, when the marginal 
effect of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 is allowed to change linearly with the quality of regulatory/governance institutions, the 
relationship varies across the horizontal governance proxies. This illustrates the salience of 
‘unpacking’ regulatory regimes in assessments of the moderating role of governance quality: this 
heterogeneity is lost when macro measures of institutions are used. Second, the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients of the interaction term in columns (2) and (4) suggest that greater 
market access for services inputs can act as a substitute for reducing regulatory barriers to 
entrepreneurship. It also suggests that of the elements that make up this composite indicator, the 
complexity of regulatory regimes is particularly important (column 4). This is consistent with the 
hypothesis advanced above that foreign providers, once granted better market access, can offer better 
                                                            4 The relevant SD provisions are Articles 9, 14, 15, 16 and 25. Monteagudo et al. (2012) and Canton, Ciriaci and Solera 
(2014) provide economic impact assessments of liberalization of services covered by the SD. 
5 See Monteagudo et al. (2012) for a detailed description of the database. 
6 Quantifications of the downstream effects of trade policy changes is beyond the scope of this paper. The empirical 
methodology implies that quantification can only be conducted at the manufacturing sector level. This is not a problem given 
our focus on analyzing the potentially heterogeneous role of different dimensions of regulatory governance in moderating the 
downstream effects of services trade policy as opposed to quantification of the magnitude of these effects. 
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quality, variety and/or prices than domestic providers by successfully overcoming prevailing barriers 
to entrepreneurship. These results are plotted in Annex I Graphs I.1 and I.2, which show that the 
estimated marginal effect of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 decreases with 𝐺𝐶 and is always negative and statistically different 
from 0 (meaning a positive downstream effect of reducing trade restrictions) when barriers to 
entrepreneurship are high (the quality of governance captured by this variable is low).  
Table 4.1. The moderating role of governance institutions: horizontal dimensions  
Dep var: log of labour 
productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 -
 
1.339 -0.266 -0.337 -0.426 -1.728** -0.312 -3.797*** 
 (0.270) (1.034) (0.745) (0.386) (0.703) (0.726) (0.599) (0.776) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶bars to entrp  -5.700**       
  (2.307)       
     𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶admin burdens   -1.060      
   (1.130)      
     𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶complexity of reg    -1.931**     
    (0.918)     
     𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶protec of incumb     -1.037    
     (1.273)    
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶state control      1.600   
      (1.250)   
     𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶gvt in business       -1.593  
       (1.293)  
     𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶public ownership        5.043*** 
        (1.287) log𝐾/𝐶 0.148*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
         
Observations 2888 2888 2888 2888 2888 2888 2888 2888 
Adj. R-squared 0.780 0.781 0.780 0.781 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.781 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-tie level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Third, the alternative measure of horizontal economic governance – captured by the scope of SOEs in 
the economy – tends to operate as a necessary condition for a positive downstream effect of services 
trade liberalisation. This is suggested by the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient 
of the interaction term in column (8). The corresponding estimated marginal effects of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 are 
reported in Annex I Graph I.3. The effect is increasing in the moderator. Moreover, it is negative and 
statistically significant (meaning a positive downstream effect of reducing trade restrictions) when the 
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barriers implied by the scope of prevailing SOEs are low enough (i.e., the quality of governance in this 
dimensions is high). This finding is consistent with the discussion in section 2.2 and indicates that bad 
governance in terms of public ownership affects market conditions in a way that cannot be overcome 
by foreign services providers. Better market access in producer services is ineffective in increasing 
downstream productivity when the barriers implied by the scope and governance of SOEs are too high. 
Table 4.2. The moderating role of governance institutions: sector-specific dimensions  
Dep var: log of labour productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 -0.900*** -2.229*** -3.109*** 0.181 
 (0.270) (0.778) (0.882) (0.630) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶transport  1.914*   
  (1.001)   
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶telecom   3.429***  
   (1.110)  
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐺𝐶business    -1.618** 
    (0.771) log𝐾/𝐶 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
     
Observations 2888 2888 2888 2888 
Adj. R-squared 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.781 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-tie level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Table 4.2 reports results for the interaction model when the regulatory variable is sector-specific, for 
three sectors: transport, telecommunications and business services. As with the horizontal economic 
governance measures, the moderating role of sector-specific regulatory differs across sectors, 
suggesting it is important to differentiate between sectoral regulatory regimes. High quality regulation 
of transport and telecommunications appears to be a necessary condition for positive downstream 
effects of services trade reforms. This is shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficients 
of the interaction term in columns (2) and (3) (for the graphical counterpart, see the corresponding 
plots of the marginal effect of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 in Annex I, Graphs I.4 and I.5). The opposite relationship 
(substitutability) holds for business services. These results are consistent with reasoning in section 2.2 
that the quality of conduct regulation in sectors that rely heavily on access to network infrastructure 
(especially the case for telecommunication services) may be condition the ability of foreign services 
providers to operate efficiently and therefore improve the quality, variety or prices of services 
available on the market. Absent effective pro-competitive sectoral regulation downstream productivity 
benefits of market access reforms do not materialise. Conversely, low quality sectoral regulation of 
business services appears to inhibit foreign services providers less. The negative coefficient estimate 
for business services in column 4 of Table 4.2 suggests a substitution relationship: market access 
reforms have the potential to trigger positive downstream effects in countries where the business 
sector is badly regulated. 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the interaction model using the proxies for EU-related governance 
institutions. The only dimension of EU-based governance that seems to have a significant impact in 
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moderating the downstream effects of services trade policy is that captured by EU membership. The 
negative sign and high level of statistical significance of coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐸𝐸 in column (2) 
suggests EU law and institutions amplify the gains from opening services markets. More narrowly 
defined measures of economic governance such as the Services Directive and the country-specific 
compliance measures do not seem to have any effect on downstream sectors. This may reflect the 
focus of the Services Directive, which spans a wide range of services, many of which enter into final 
demand as opposed to being inputs into production (e.g., hotels, restaurants, tourist agencies). 
However, the same finding holds if the focus is limited to compliance for business services only. Of 
course this does not mean that the SD has not had effects. Monteagudo et al. (2012) for example find 
that the SD and compliance with its requirements has an sizable direct positive effect on the 
productivity of the targeted services sectors. 
Table 4.3. The moderating role of governance institutions: EU dimensions  
Dep var: log of labour 
productivity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 -0.900*** -0.022 -0.945*** -0.940*** -0.961*** 
 (0.270) (0.409) (0.266) (0.268) (0.272) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐸𝐸  -1.153***    
  (0.369)    
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝑆𝑆   0.249   
   (0.707)   
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆all    0.267  
    (0.859)  
𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆business     0.485 
     (1.047) log𝐾/𝐶 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
      
Observations 2888 2888 2888 2888 2888 
Adj. R-squared 0.780 0.781 0.780 0.780 0.780 
 
Note: All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the country-tie level are reported between brackets. Statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
The results of our analysis suggest that countries that underperform in terms of domestic economic 
governance variables that are likely to have complementary relationship with market access 
liberalisation should prioritise reforms to improve governance performance. Areas of 
regulation/governance where this may be the case include public ownership and conduct regulation in 
transport and telecommunication sectors. However, in cases where market access can substitute for 
regulatory improvement the policy implication of our analysis is that there is no need to be concerned 
with sequencing or coordination between services trade liberalisation and pursuit of regulatory reform 
and improving economic governance. Instead, countries that underperform in domestic governance 
dimensions where there is a substitution relationship with market access liberalisation, are likely to 
obtain the highest short term positive effects of services trade liberalisation. Our results suggest that 
substitutability may prevail in cases where countries perform poorly with respect to barriers to 
entrepreneurship and conduct regulation in business services. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Services comprise a substantial share of all inputs used by firms. The cost, quality and variety of 
services available to firms is one determinant of their competitiveness. Sector-specific restrictive trade 
policies will impact on the degree of competition on services markets, and thus markups and sectoral 
efficiency. Recent compilations of prevailing policies across countries by the OECD and the World 
Bank have shown that barriers to trade in services are often significant, translating into estimates of ad 
valorem tariff equivalents that are substantially higher than trade barriers for goods (Jafari and Tarr, 
2017). There is therefore a presumption that liberalisation will lower average prices and expand the 
variety of services on the market. An expanding body of empirical research analysing the linkages 
between services trade policies and downstream productivity performance has identified sizable 
positive effects of liberalising services trade on the productivity and export performance of firms. 
Because producer services are regulated, liberalisation of trade in services is more complex than 
opening up markets for goods. In the TTIP context, for example, civil society groups made clear their 
concerns that opening up services sectors to greater foreign competition might erode regulatory 
standards (Young, 2016).  
The analysis in this paper is motivated by recent findings in the literature that weak governance may 
substantially reduce the magnitude of the potential benefits of services trade policy reforms. There are 
substantial differences across EU member states both when it comes to services trade policies towards 
the rest of the world. There is also great variability in regulatory regimes, whether horizontal in nature 
(affecting the economy as a whole) or services-sector specific. Our premise is that it is important to 
pay more attention to how different dimensions of economic governance interact with services trade 
policies and that doing so can help inform policy reform efforts. Insofar as more narrowly defined 
measures of regulatory governance are shown to reduce the potential benefits of services liberalisation, 
these may be easier to address than broader dimensions of governance such as control of corruption or 
the rule of law. The finding that in some circumstances trade policy reforms (services liberalisation) 
need to be accompanied by action to improve domestic regulatory governance whereas in other 
situations market access liberalisation can act as a substitute for regulatory improvement suggests that 
greater effort to ‘unpack’ the effects of regulatory institutions on services trade reforms is needed. Our 
results also have implications for model-based efforts to assess the impacts of services liberalisation 
initiatives in trade agreements as these may overestimate the potential benefits if account is not taken 
of the moderating effect that regulatory regimes may have.  
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ANNEX  
Summary statistics 
Table I.1. Summary statistics  
Variable name Mean Median SD Min Max 
Labour productivity 10.921 10.865 0.585 7.696 14.142 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.064 0.052 0.048 0.006 0.338 
𝐺𝐶bars to entrp 0.43 0.436 0.135 0.152 0.689 
𝐺𝐶admin burdens 0.444 0.415 0.186 0.053 0.827 
𝐺𝐶complexity of reg 0.516 0.556 0.182 0.137 0.857 
𝐺𝐶protec of incumb 0.38 0.374 0.164 0.064 0.718 
𝐺𝐶state ctrl 0.452 0.436 0.185 0 0.815 
𝐺𝐶gvt in business 0.336 0.3 0.211 0 0.915 
𝐺𝐶public ownership 0.509 0.533 0.182 0.096 0.873 
𝐺𝐶transport 0.559 0.6 0.202 0 0.972 
𝐺𝐶telecom 0.569 0.572 0.2 0.03 0.902 
𝐺𝐶business 0.426 0.305 0.309 0.005 1 
𝐸𝐸 0.758 1 0.429 0 1 
𝑆𝑆 0.178 0 0.383 0 1 
𝑆𝑆𝑆all 0.145 0 0.313 0 0.928 
𝑆𝑆𝑆business 0.131 0 0.29 0 0.922 
log𝐾/𝐶 12.126 11.891 1.22 9.331 16.153 
 
Note: Summary statistics are computed on the estimation sample of 2888 observations used in all 
regressions. 
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Estimated marginal effects of CRI in interaction models with 
horizontal economic governance variables 
 
Graph I.1. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂bars to entrp 
Graph I.2. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂complexity of reg 
  
Graph I.3. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂public ownership 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated based on the specifications reported in Table 4.1 for which the 
point estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant. 
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Estimated marginal effects of CRI in interaction models with sector-
specific regulatory governance 
 
Graph I.4. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂transport 
Graph I.5. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂telecom 
  
Graph I.6. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 
𝐆𝐂business 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated based on the specifications reported in Table 4.2 for which the 
point estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant. 
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Estimated marginal effects of CRI in interaction models with EU 
institutions 
 
Graph I.7. Marginal effects of 𝐂𝐂𝐂 as function of 𝐄𝐄 
 
Note: Marginal effects are estimated based on the specifications reported in Table 4.3 for which the 
point estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant. 
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